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18 April 1959

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

18 April 1959


### DAILY BRIEF

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#### I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

#### II. ASIA-AFRICA

OK Iraq: Communist pressures have resulted in a number of personnel changes in important Iraqi government posts, and a major revision of the Iraqi cabinet is reported to be impending. 


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OK Baghdad Pact - Iraq - Afghanistan: (During a meeting of the Baghdad Council of Deputies on 14 April, both Iran and Pakistan voiced "grave concern" over events in Iraq and the Afghan arms build-up. Iran fears the possible formation of a Middle East version of the Warsaw Pact, linking Iraq, Afghanistan, and the USSR. Iranian and Pakistani expressions of concern are probably prompted in part by the desire for firmer Western security guarantees and for additional military aid. Pakistan is considering whether to respond to Nasir's attempted mobilization of Islamic forces against Communist penetration.) 

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NO Tunisia-UAR: (The Tunisian and UAR governments have agreed to accept Moroccan mediation of their differences as a means of bringing about the active participation of Tunisia in the Arab League, according to the Moroccan ambassador in Baghdad. Moroccan Crown Prince Moulay Hassan, who arrived in Cairo on 20 April for a ten-day visit, is expected to participate in the first round of mediation talks.) 

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### III. THE WEST

OK Caribbean: A group of Latin American liberals agreed at a meeting in Costa Rica with former President Jose Figueres that the Communist threat in Cuba is of alarming proportions. Referring also to Communist activities in Venezuela and Costa Rica, Gonzalo Facio, Figueres' chief adviser, said he and many of the others feel that the "current crisis in the Caribbean is the greatest in Latin American history." While this evaluation may be somewhat overdrawn, the fears expressed are generally justified. [REDACTED]

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NO France: (All French diplomatic representatives have received a strongly worded directive to pose to France's friends a choice between friendship with France or tolerance of Algerian rebel activities on their soil. France has already informed the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia it will break relations if Moscow and Belgrade recognize the rebel provisional government. French military leaders have been pressing for a "diplomatic campaign" to complement the military victory they maintain they have achieved in Algeria.) [REDACTED]

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DAILY BRIEF

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NO  
Netherlands: (The new coalition government, expected to be installed soon, after more than a month of negotiating, will be further to the right than its predecessor and may take a stiffer attitude against Western arms sales to Indonesia. Dutch officials have already warned that intended shipments of aircraft from the United States and other NATO countries may result in increased pressures for a defense build-up in West New Guinea at the expense of the Netherlands' NATO commitments.

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC  
(No Back-Up Material)

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Personnel Changes in Iraqi Government

Communist pressures, aimed at gradually consolidating the party's influence in the Iraqi Government, have resulted in a number of further personnel changes in important posts. Anti-Communist, National Democrat Husayn Jamil has been ousted as minister of guidance, and on 17 April Baghdad announced his appointment as ambassador to Iran. His brother, Talib Jamil, is still technically director general of the Economic Ministry but states that he has been on "a month's vacation which may last several months."

On 16 April Baghdad announced the resignation of three senior Foreign Ministry officials. The Iraqi Communist press has assailed Foreign Minister Jawad himself, and is berating the ministry for appointing Ali Haider Sulaiman as ambassador to the United States. Two directors general of the Social Affairs Ministry have been removed in quick succession, and Communist newspapers are calling for the elimination from this ministry of "large numbers of conspirators and enemies of the republic."

The government has decided to enlarge the cabinet from 16 to 20 ministerial posts by abolishing the Ministry of Development and creating five new specialized economic ministries. There are persistent reports that a Communist party member will be named to head at least one of these. The present ministers of interior, finance, agriculture, education, foreign affairs, and social affairs may resign soon.

The Communists, who have had little direct representation in the cabinet, are reported to be particularly anxious to obtain control of the Interior and Foreign ministries, as well as to replace Brigadier al-Abdi as military governor general of Iraq. Pro-Communist Brigadier Farid Dhia Mahmoud was recently named acting deputy chief of staff for operations following the arrest of Brigadier Shakir Mahmoud Shukri.

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[REDACTED]

Iran and Pakistan Again Express Concern Over Developments  
In Iraq and Afghanistan

(Iran and Pakistan, during a meeting of the Baghdad Pact Council of Deputies on 14 April in Ankara, again expressed alarm over recent developments in Iraq and grave concern over the "mounting hostility of Afghanistan." Their statements reflect a feeling of growing encirclement by hostile powers, but may be motivated to some degree by a desire for additional military equipment and Western guarantees.)

(Iran referred to the shipment of Soviet arms to Afghanistan and to the thinness of its defenses on Afghanistan's border. It expressed fear that Iraq and Afghanistan might link themselves with the USSR in a Middle East version of the Warsaw Pact and urged action to reduce Iraq's reliance on the Soviet Union. Pakistan suggested the possibility that the USSR could use Afghanistan as a base to conduct "aggression by proxy.")

(Pakistan is considering whether it should respond to Nasir's call to mobilize the resources of Islam against Communist penetration of the Middle East. Great Britain, on the other hand, considers Nasir's activities dangerous because they are pushing Qasim toward the Communists, and both Britain and Turkey stated that they still regard Qasim as the best hope for Iraq.)

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

Morocco May Be Able to Mediate Tunisian-UAR Differences

(The Tunisian and UAR governments have agreed to accept Moroccan mediation of their differences as a means of returning Tunisia to active participation in the Arab League, according to the Moroccan ambassador in Baghdad. Moroccan Crown Prince Moulay Hassan, who visited Tunis earlier this month and will arrive in Cairo on 20 April for a ten-day visit, is expected to participate in the first round of mediation talks.)

(Tunisia broke diplomatic relations with the UAR last October after a long-standing dispute arising from UAR President Nasir's support for Tunisian President Bourguiba's rival, exiled former Neo-Destour Secretary General Salah ben Youssef. Failing to find support within the Arab League for his sharp criticism of Nasir's tactics, Bourguiba has not participated in league sessions for six months. Early this month, however, he indicated he was willing to participate in the Beirut meeting of Arab League foreign ministers "if this meeting really intends to solve disputes, including ours with the UAR." Failing such assurances, Tunisia did not attend the Beirut meeting. On other occasions, he has indicated a willingness to patch up his quarrel with Nasir on condition that UAR facilities afforded Ben Youssef be withdrawn.)

(Bourguiba and Nasir, at the urging of other Arab states, notably Lebanon and Morocco, may welcome steps toward some sort of rapprochement. In his dispute with Iraq, Nasir is particularly in need of as much support in the Arab world as he can muster. Relations between the two governments, however, are unlikely to be cordial, and the two leaders will continue to vie both for leadership in the Arab world and for the exertion of maximum influence over the Algerian rebels.)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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### III. THE WEST

#### Communist Threat in Caribbean Area

The Communist threat in the Caribbean area is considered alarming by a group of Latin American and US liberals meeting in Costa Rica with former President Jose Figueres. The group, which includes representatives of Figueres' National Liberation party (PLN) and of Venezuelan President Betancourt's Democratic Action party (AD), is particularly concerned over Communist penetration of the Cuban Government.

Figueres and Betancourt are justified in their fear that Communist-controlled Nicaraguan and Dominican revolutionary groups, which have been sympathetically received and encouraged by Cuban officials, will spread Communism throughout the area. Gonzalo Facio, Figueres' right-hand man, referred to Communist activities in Venezuela and Costa Rica and told US Ambassador Willauer that he and many others at the meeting feel the "current Caribbean crisis is the greatest in Latin American history."

The group meeting in Costa Rica represents some of the most influential elements in the democratic, antidictator campaign in Latin America, which the Communists are trying to penetrate. The leftist but non-Communist PLN and AD gave Castro moral and material support during his long struggle against the Batista dictatorship, but now have become disillusioned. However, Costa Rican Communist leader Manuel Mora, just back from a visit in Cuba, delivered a lengthy speech on 15 April defending all aspects of the Castro regime and violently attacking Figueres as a tool of the American Embassy.

The anti-Communist potential of the Cuban middle-class elements, who are influential in the Castro administration, is strong and the press has recently shown increased awareness of the Communist threat. One paper identified the Communists as the real counterrevolutionaries in Cuba today.

[REDACTED]

France Steps Up Diplomatic Offensive Against Algerian Rebels

(France has issued circular instructions "in imperative terms" to French diplomatic representatives to pose a choice between friendship with France and the Algerian rebels to all governments extending material aid or tolerating rebel activities on their soil. The instructions call for strong demarches, a protest to the UN secretary general against rebel activity at UN headquarters, moves to counter FLN propaganda, and increased pressure on Tunisia and Morocco.)

(De Gaulle personally has informed the Soviet and Yugoslav ambassadors that France will break relations if Moscow and Belgrade recognize the Algerian rebel provisional government. De Gaulle and other French officials have bitterly charged US "encouragement" of the rebels, and most recently have protested their admission into the United States. When De Gaulle withdrew the French Mediterranean fleet from NATO wartime control, French spokesmen said the move was made because of the lack of a common Western policy on North Africa.)

(While the circular states that De Gaulle's cease-fire offer still holds, the tougher French line reflects Paris' feeling that the real struggle with the rebels now is outside Algeria. It anticipates continued French military occupation of Algeria for a long period, although French military leaders argue that they have broken the armed rebellion. They are pressing the government to discourage the rebels' efforts to win support abroad.)

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New Dutch Government Expected Soon

(A new Dutch coalition government, including Catholic, Protestant, and Liberal parties and headed by Catholic Prof. J. Dequay, is expected to be installed within the next week after over a month of negotiations. The Labor party, which precipitated the 12 March national elections by withdrawing from Prime Minister Drees' cabinet in December, now will be in the opposition. The new government will be further to the right than the Drees cabinet, in which elements of the Labor party exercised a moderating influence, and is even more deeply committed to Dutch retention of West New Guinea. It is prepared, if necessary, to weaken the Netherlands' contribution to NATO to support this stand and will probably protest more strongly against arms sales to Indonesia by the United States and other NATO countries.)

(The Dutch representative at a NATO committee meeting in Paris on 14 April, in fact, warned of severe political repercussions in The Hague if the United States proceeds with projected shipments of C-130-B transports and other arms to Indonesia and said, [redacted] that popular and parliamentary support for NATO would inevitably deteriorate. Defense build-up in West New Guinea, he said, would have to be at the expense of Dutch NATO commitments, since over-all defense expenditures are not likely to be increased.)

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(Further expression of Dutch resentment over Western deliveries of military items to Indonesia may be expected at the next NATO committee meeting on 21 April. As evidence of the danger of Indonesian aggression, the Dutch may produce a list of military items including parachutes, for which Djakarta is reported to have been shopping "all over the world.") [redacted]

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